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Abstract 
The theory of strategic groups predicts the existence of stable groups of companies 
that adopt similar business strategies. The theory also predicts that groups will differ in 
performance and in their reaction to external shocks. We use cluster analysis to identify 
strategic groups in the Polish banking sector. We find stable groups in the Polish banking 
sector constituted after the year 2000 following the major privatisation and ownership 
changes connected with transition to the mostly-privately-  owned banking sector in the 
late 90s. Using panel regression methods we show that the allocation of banks to groups 
is statistically significant in explaining the profitability of banks. Thus, breaking down the 
banks into strategic groups and allowing for the different reaction of the groups to exter-
nal shocks helps in a more accurate explanation of profits of the banking sector as a whole. 
Therefore, a more precise ex ante assessment of the loss absorption capabilities of banks 
is possible, which is crucial for an analysis of banking sector stability. However, we did 
not find evidence of the usefulness of strategic groups in explaining the quality of bank 
portfolios as measured by irregular loans over total loans, which is a more direct way to 
assess risks to financial stability. 
Keywords: strategic groups, financial stability, clustering, Ward algorithm, panel re-
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Introduction  1 
The theory of strategic groups predicts that groups of similar entities are formed be-
cause of the convergent behaviour of some companies operating in a given market. Ac-
cording to the theory, the number of available strategies is limited. By choosing a given 
strategy a company assigns itself to a certain group. Strategic groups are relatively stable 
over time, which is a conse  quence of mobility barriers. In empirical research that applies 
strategic group theory to the banking sector, it was assumed that a bank’s strategy was re-
flected in the structure of its balance sheet. The shares of particular balance sheet items 
in total assets or the shares of particular loan categories in total loan portfolio were called 
strategic variables or strategic dimensions. The aim of this paper is to verify whether stra-
tegic groups make it possible to model banks’ performance more accurately. We identify 
strategic groups in the Polish banking sector and test whether their profitabilities differ 
sig  nificantly. Then we use group dummy variables in panel regression models. The sta-
tistical significance of a group variable in the panel models both supports the thesis of the 
significant differences between groups’ performances and may improve modeling of bank-
ing sector profits, allowing for different reactions of particular groups to external shocks. 
This could improve the ex ante assessment of the profit-generating potential of banks and 
thus support a more forward looking approach to the analysis of the stability of the bank-
ing sector. 
The composition of groups may be disturbed by ownership changes en  tailing a shift 
in the strategies of banks. Since there were many mergers and acquisitions in the second 
half of the 1990s in the Polish banking sector, the stability of groups over time may be 
hampered. On the other hand, the share of foreign capital in the Polish banking sector in-
creased substantially at that time. This might have widened the scope of services offered 
by banks, which should be manifested through increased similarity of particular strate  gic 
groups.1 If this is the case, privatisation of the Polish banking sector in the second half of 
1990s might have led to the convergence of banks’ strategies, followed by the formation 
of strategic groups. 
This article reviews the history (Section 2) and the empirical research (Section 3) re-
garding strategic groups. The data we use are described in Section 4, whereas Section 5 
focuses on the methods and tools used to iden  tify groups and test the hypothesis of the 
significance of groups in explaining the performance of the banks. Section 6 presents the 
strategic groups identified in the Pol  ish banking sector and Section 7 concludes and out-
lines some directions for further research. 
Strategic groups in theory  2 
The theory of strategic groups was introduced by Hunt (1972) and further developed 
by Newman (1978). A strategic group is usually defined as a group of companies operat-
ing within a single industry that adopt a similar strategy as regards products offered and 
resources used (Porter, 1979). 
1 This conclusion requires two assumptions: firstly, the scope of services offered by banks increases quicker than 
the scope of available services in the banking sector and secondly, the scope of available services in the banking sec-
tor has its limits. 155
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Thus, within a strategic group, companies make similar decisions in key areas (Koller, 
2001), their similar strategies being characterised by similar values of certain variables, 
called strategic variables or strategic di  mensions. Within a group, the strategies of the 
companies are to a large extent homogeneous, while they differ substantially between 
groups. 
The idea of strategic groups has been popularized by Caves and Porter (1977), who, 
apart from barriers to entry, introduced the term of barriers to mobility. The concept of 
mobility barriers was enforced to explain the ratio  nale behind the creation of homogene-
ous groups of companies. Groups are formed as a result of discontinuity in available strat-
egies, which are unevenly distributed over the space spanned by strategic variables. Por-
ter (1980) states that available strategies prevent a company from taking an entrenched 
position midway between two strategies. 
Mobility barriers may be perceived as a wall separating a given group from its exter-
nal competition and discouraging a given company from mov  ing to another group. It is 
believed that mobility barriers may result similar investments being taken by companies 
within R group that increase their competitiveness and profitability. At the same time, 
these financially motivated investments prevent or impede access to a given technology 
or patents to third parties. Such investments may include research into a new technology 
or invention as well as advertising. In the latter case, the bar  rier to mobility will comprise 
a good market position, a recognised brand or the reputation of companies in a group (Fer-
guson et al., 2000). In such a case mobility barriers emerge as a result of similar activities 
being undertaken by enterprises. However, they may also result from the provision of sim-
ilar products. Empirical research confirms the existence of barriers to mobility (Mascaren-
has and Aaker, 1989); however, the mechanism of their occurrence has not yet been ulti-
mately identified. 
The profitability of a financial institution depends to a large extent on its ability to 
keep existing and win new customers as well as on the quality of risk management. There-
fore, investments that might prove to be significant mobility barriers should to a larger 
extent involve expenses related to the development of a branch network or risk manage-
ment models. Expenses related to advertising which, on the one hand, build the bank’s 
brand and, on the other hand, support sales of products that also serve as an indication of 
the strategy adopted by the bank, may also turn out to be material for the formation of 
strategic groups. 
Adopting the assumption that mobility barriers do exist leads to three conclusions 
(Leask, 2004), which may be recognised as predictions of the strategic groups theory. 
First, the theory allows for the existence of strategic groups hierarchy. Groups compris-
ing more effective companies with higher mobility barriers are separated from groups of 
companies with lower prof  itability. Second, changes in the environment exert a different 
influence on particular groups, based on the differences in the impact of external factors, 
related to various levels of protection regarding the mobility barriers. How  ever, compa-
nies within the same group respond in a similar way to changes in external factors. Third, 
the theory suggests that the lack of mobility between groups results to a large extent from 
a company’s history and its ac  cumulated assets rather than from the nature of investments 
currently undertaken. 156
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Porter (1979), on the other hand, argues that the existence of strategic groups reduc-
es the level of competition within an industry. It results from co-ordination and co-oper-
ation between group members, which takes the competition within particular groups to a 
level lower than that of competition between groups. The scope of this dependency is con-
ditioned by three factors: the number of groups and the distribution of their shares in the 
market, the diversity among the groups (the so-called strategic distance) and the level of 
diversity in the profiles of buyers of services and products (Heene and Houthoofd, 
2002). 
Co-ordination of activities rather than co-operation seems to be of greater importance 
for the formation of groups in the banking sector. This is because strategic groups may 
arise around the common strategies, which may result from following the strategy of a 
counterparty. For instance, smaller banks often imitate the behaviour of banks that have 
a stronger market position. This is particularly important in the case of changes in inter-
est rates on loans and deposits. On the other hand, lasting co-operation among banks re-
lated to a particular project is rather difficult to imagine at the level of strategic groups, 
although exceptions occur. An example of interbank co-operation on the level of the whole 
banking sector might consist of private bank loan registers or private payment systems. 
Loan syndications are, on the other hand, an example of co-operation among banks, which 
may occur at the level of a strategic group or beyond. 
The development of the strategic groups theory was based on the premise of the ex-
planation of the differences in performance of particular companies op  erating within the 
same industry. The existence of mobility barriers does not explain, however, the differ-
ences in profits; it only implies that these differences may be sustained over time. In order 
to explain the origin of dif  ferences in the profitability of particular groups, the authors of 
the strategic groups theory (Porter, 1980) used the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the structure of the market, un-
derstood in a way that focuses on the size and number of particular players, determines 
the position of a company in a given market and defines its strategy, which influences its 
profitability. Thus, initially, the existence of strategic groups was linked to the relative 
sizes of companies oper  ating in a given market (Caves and Porter, 1978; Caves and Pugel, 
1980). Further research, however, expands the analysis to a larger number of strate  gic di-
mensions, which generally concern the structure of the balance sheets of particular com-
panies (Passmore, 1985; Amel and Rhoades, 1988). 
In this regard, the theory implies that there may exist considerable differ  ences in the 
profitability of companies among groups, which are sustainable over time. A company 
will find it difficult to move to a more effective group due to mobility barriers (Caves and 
Porter, 1977). The theory also predicts different reactions of companies to external shocks, 
which may entail certain differ  ences in the mechanism of interest rate transmission in par-
ticular groups (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). To trigger the intended response of the system 
to a change in interest rates, the effective monetary policy must therefore take into ac-
count, among other things, different reactions of banks from different strategic groups. 
Different profitabilities of banks may stem also from the different risk atti  tudes of 
banks. They may also be the result of specialisation in particular services on the market. 157
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Regulatory constraints and the level of risk aversion of the shareholders force a bank to 
accept a particular return from efficient frontier coming out of Markovitz portfolio theo-
ry (Hart and Jaffee, 1974) applied to their assets and liabilities structure. Analysis of stra-
tegic groups may help to capture portfolio theory effect influencing bank profitability. 
Review of empirical research  3 
In spite of the criticism expressed towards both the theory and the methodology of 
identifying strategic groups (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990; Cool and Dier  ickx, 1993; Fer-
guson et al., 2000; Hatten and Hatten, 1987; Ketchen and Shook, 1996), the popularity of 
research on strategic groups has resulted in multi  ple empirical research aimed at identi-
fying groups in particular industries. Research has been related both to manufacturing 
companies: the brewing (Tremblay, 1985: Heene and Houthoofd, 2002) and the pharma-
ceutical industry (Cool and Dierickx, 1993), and to service providers: healthcare (Nath 
and Grucka, 1907). IT (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1905), and financial companies: the in-
surance sector (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1993) and the banking sector (Amel and Rhoades, 
1988; Mehra, 1996). 
Initially, research into strategic groups linked the membership of a com  pany in a group 
to the relative size of the company (its market share), which resulted directly from the 
adoption of the structure-conduct-performance hy  pothesis. Such an approach was used 
by Porter (1979) and Caves and Pugel (1980). Newman (1978) noticed that the existence 
of strategic groups may stem from the adoption of various target functions by different 
companies. 
Oster (1982), on the other hand, uses the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales rev-
enues as a strategic variable. She also proposes basing the sep  aration of groups on certain 
leading variables, i.e. predetermined variables, which would be used in all research relat-
ed to the identification of strategic groups. It would be difficult, however, to identify such 
variables for various industries, since some balance sheet items may differ significantly 
among industries, reflecting different type of activities or the different environment in 
which companies operate. This, in particular, is the case of the banking sec  tor, since the 
asset and liability structure of banks differ substantially from the balance sheets of com-
panies from other industries. Oster’s (1982) recom  mendation may be taken into consid-
eration only when conducting research related to a certain industry. 
All papers mentioned above assume that strategic groups exist and are defined by a 
certain variable selected a priori by the researcher (Amel and Rhoades, 1988). Hayes et 
al. (1983) conducted research aimed at determining whether strategic groups may be sin-
gled out within US investment banks without predefining strategic variables. However, 
to identify groups, they use a simple correlation vector analysis and measure co-move-
ment of banks’ earnings, which - as Amel and Rhoades (1988) demonstrated - does not 
necessarily determine the existence of groups. Passmore’s (1985) works round this short-
coming by not predefining strategic variables but analysing the shares of particular bal-
ance sheet items in the total portfolios of the 50 largest commercial hanks in the United 
States. Passsmore divides banks into two groups on the basis of the correlation between 
particular variables. The identified breakdown overlaps with the classification of banks 
as wholesale and retail commercial banks. 158
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Amel and Rhoades (1988) agree with Passmore’s idea about identifying groups using 
the shares of particular assets in the total bank portfolio rather than variables based on the 
profit and loss account. Their justification is based on the assumption that the strategy 
adopted by a manager should be better reflected in the balance sheet rather than in the fi-
nancial results. Moreover, such an approach is coherent with the theory that membership 
of a company in a given group sterns from its history, which is reflected in accumulated 
assets (cf. Chapter 2). Moreover, Amel and Rhoades (1988) also first used a more refined 
method of group identification - the cluster analysis, which also allows for grouping using 
more than one strategic variable. In addition, the authors test the stability of the break-
down into groups, checking whether banks migrate between the identified groups in three 
different years. 
In this respect, the empirical identification of groups thatare sustainable over time is 
of particular significance, since the definition of a strategic group is related to a time ho-
rizon that is longer than one year. A breakdown identified in a given year may stem from 
adopting short-term strategies or may be accidental (Amel and Rhoades, 1988). The au-
thors identified six groups that were stable over time. The allocation of a bank to a given 
group does not depend on the size of a bank’s assets nor its location (small-large cities, 
particular slates). The groups identified by Amel and Rhoades (1988) do not overlap with 
the common classification of banks as wholesale and retail commercial banks. 
The concept of strategic groups was created to explain the systematic differences in 
financial results among companies in an industry. Thus, most of the empirical research 
was focused on the significance of differences in profitability between particular groups. 
To that end, most researchers found significant differences in financial results between 
groups identified, us  ing cluster analysis (Dess and David, 1984: Reger and Huff, 1993; 
Heene and Houthoofd, 2002). Some of the authors, however, did not detect significant 
differences in profitabilities that could be explained by allocation to par  ticular groups (Fra-
zier and Howell, 1983; Cool and Schendel, 1987; Martens, 1988). Nevertheless, papers 
that analysed the banking sectors generally identified significant differences between 
groups in terms of prof  itability (Mehra, 1996; Koller, 2001). In addition, the research car-
ried out by Hackethal (2001) showed that only the allocation of a bank to a group based 
on market variables helped in explaining differences in profitabilities. On the other hand, 
there were no significant differences in ROA or ROE between the groups identified using 
resource based variables.2
To that end, none of the studies which identified strategic groups in the banking sec-
tor has been aimed at explaining earnings while taking profit-risk interdependence into 
consideration. The earnings of a company operating in the financial sector may be signif-
icantly influenced - apart from the quality of management - by the adopted risk profile. 
Nevertheless, assuming that the risk profile has been already reflected in the balance sheet 
structure of a bank, the classification of banks into strategic groups, using variables that 
represent ratios of particular assets over total assets, should make it possible to identify 
2 HilckethaI (2001) introduced two kinds of breakdowns of 624 European commercial banks: one was based on 
resource-based-view variables, e.g. share of deposits in total assets or the ratio of deposits placed to deposits accept-
ed on the interbank market, whereas the other was based on market-based-view variables, e.g. the average growth in 
assets or share of loans ill total assets. Thus, each bank was classified into two groups. 159
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groups, which take also the bank’s risk profile into account. In the banking sector signif-
icant differences should occur not only between profitabilities but also between adopted 
risk profiles. In this regard, it is worth noting that off-balance sheet positions could be a 
major source of the risk exposure profile of banks. However, we assume that off-balance 
sheet positions are mostly used for hedging and therefore do not influence t risk profile 
to a large extent. This assumption is fully justified for Polish banks but not necessarily for 
large and complex financial institutions or global investment banks. 
Amel and Rhoades (1988) set a kind of benchmark for research on strate  gic groups 
in the banking sector. Most of the studies concerning this sector take into account their 
conclusions that balance sheet-based variables should be used for the identification of 
strategic groups (Koller, 2001; Hackethal, 2001). Similarly to Amel and Rhoades (1988) 
and Koller (2001) for Austrian banks, Hackethal (2001) for European banks uses a non-
hierarchical cluster analysis as a tool of classification of banks into groups. The basic idea 
behind break  ing down banks into clusters is merging banks using the minimum distance 
between standardised strategic variables as a criterion. 
Since 1979 when Porter first announced his theory and since Amel and Rhoades (1988) 
applied the theory for banks, the banking sector has under  gone a significant transforma-
tion, related to deregulation, increased compe  tition, improved risk management techniques 
and increased reliance on off  -balance sheet financing (via securitisation) and exposures 
(via off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles), which all might have affected the perfor-
mance of the theory in this new banking environment. Nevertheless, the Polish banking 
sector is still in its infancy and many of the techniques of the modern banking sector (e.g.: 
securitisation, off-balance sheet risk manage  ment, financing via covered bonds) have yet 
to be implemented or developed. Thus, we think, that the Polish banking sector at this 
stage of development and with a relatively small concentration is more similar to the bank-
ing sec  tors of developed economies as they were two-three decades ago. 
In this respect, application of the theory and the method of the analysis to the Polish 
banking sector is more justified than it would be for more developed banking sectors. Nev-
ertheless, the major privatisation in the Polish banking sector in the second half of the 1990s 
should contribute to increased concen  tration and convergence of strategies among banks, 
which would lead to less pronounced distinctions between the groups in the future. 
Although most researchers have identified strategic groups in the re  searched sectors, 
some of them questioned the existence of any significant breakdowns within industries 
and claim that strategic groups stem from us  ing false detection methods or are the result 
of an ad hoc choice of a strategic variable (Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988; Barney and 
Hoskisson, 1990). 
Leask (2004) criticises research on strategic groups. He claims that par  ticular research-
ers select industry-specific variables, for which the differences may be significant in one 
industry but not necessarily in another. Similarly to Oster (1982), he criticizes the fact that 
there is no standard for selecting vari  ables constituting strategy dimensions, which is why 
they are somewhat subjective. He proposes focusing on several predefined strategic var-
iables, so that the results of research become comparable. Other criticism concerns the 
lack of a unified method used to classify companies into groups and errors in the use of 
techniques based on cluster analysis. Leask notes that the majority of researchers do not 160
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use any test for consistency of results that would be alternative to cluster analysis per se. 
Another common error is including significantly correlated variables in analyses, which 
results in multiple use of the same information. 
Leask’s requirement that the same set of strategic variables be applied to identify stra-
tegic groups cannot be met in the case of the banking sector, due to different characteris-
tics of the balance sheets of financial institutions when compared to those of manufactur-
ing companies. Nevertheless, while selecting strategic variables we took into account most 
of the balance sheet structure variables analysed by Amel and Rhoades (1988) and Koller 
(2001). Thus, we attempted to make our research comparable with other research on stra-
tegic groups in the banking sector. 
In spite of the criticism, the research seems to have achieved a certain level of ana-
lytical standard, which makes it possible to claim that it has become a recognised field of 
research (Heene and Houthoofd, 2002). 
Data - strategy dimensions  4 
The data analysed in this paper come from the banking statistics of the na  tional Bank 
of Poland, which collects mandatory monthly financial reports from all commercial banks 
operating in Poland, including three banks asso  ciating cooperative banks, from the period 
between the first quarter of 1997 and the third quarter of 2004. The banks that went bank-
rupt during that time or were managed by a board of trustees were included, too. The data 
include the balance sheet items as at the end of March, June, September and December3 
or quarterly data for the profit and loss account items. The ratios related to the strategic 
variables were derived from yearly data. For balance sheet data, the arithmetic mean was 
calculated for particular items as at the end of each quarter. For profit and loss account 
items, the ra  tios were calculated using the values of particular items as at year-end. If a 
bank terminated its operations or was taken over by another bank during a year, it was in-
cluded into the analysis until the end of the year preceding its liquidation or acquisition. 
The measure of homogeneity (similarity) in the cluster analysis is the de  gree of di-
versity between particular strategic variables in subsequent periods. We have classified 
these variables into three categories: 
Category I: variables describe the strategy of use of acquired resources. 
They define the market segment or the product group in which a given bank focuses 
its activity. Some of the ratios also characterise major customer groups - on the asset 
side: 
total loans / total assets  •	
loans to individuals / total loans  •	
housing loans / loans to households  •	
corporate loans / total loans  •	
securities / total assets  •	
3 Data on Treasury bills are an exception - the average of their balances at the end of every month of a quarter 
was taken into account instead, due to the high volatility of this asset category. 161
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foreign currency loans / foreign currency liabilities.  •	
Category II: variables describe the strategy of acquiring resources. The ratios below 
define the way a bank acquires resources to finance assets and measure its competitive-
ness in this area. Some of the variables characterise also customer groups - on the liabili-
ties side. 
Net debt on the interbank market / total assets  •	
Debt in foreign financial institutions / total assets  •	
Deposits from individuals / total assets  •	
Corporate deposits / total assets  •	
Foreign currency deposits from non-financial sector / total assets.  •	
Category III: variables describe the strategy in a bank’s structure of costs and reve-
nues. They are taken into account in order to differentiate between retail and wholesale 
banks. 
Total assets per employee (the lower the ratio, the more retail the bank is - more  •	
numerous customer service staff) 
Salaries / total assets  •	
Fee income / income from banking activity (indicates whether the bank focuses on  •	
the margin income or income from services) 
Personnel costs per employed. •	 4 
We used all the variables mentioned above jointly to identify strategic groups. In ad-
dition, separate clusters were identified for the three categories. Thus, we classified banks 
on the basis of a multidimensional analysis, i.e. analysis of clusters in three different di-
mensions defined by variables from particular categories, as well as on the basis of a one-
dimensional analysis taking into account clusters identified using all variables jointly. 
Such an approach aims, among other things, at defining which of the categories of vari-
ables (which of the dimensions) help in explaining the banks’ earnings the most. Howev-
er, in the panel regression analysis we did not use a multidimensional analysis, since we 
needed only one breakdown to define dummy variables. 
According to theoretical deliberations, potential variables that arc strat  egy dimensions 
should include such values as risk management quality, the ability to maintain the exist-
ing and win new customers, expenses for the de  velopment of a branch network and risk 
management models, or expenditure on advertising. Furthermore, some other variables, 
not necessarily linked to the ratios based on balance sheets or profit and loss accounts, 
such as marketplace, customer type, pricing strategy, marketing strategy, risk management 
quality, bank risk aversion, etc, may also have an influence on the classifi  cation of a bank 
into a strategic group. Although it is commonly assumed in the strategic group literature 
that the strategy linked to these variables should have already been reflected in the stra-
tegic dimensions, as measured by the balance sheet ratios, more research is needed to test 
whether this is actually the case. Nevertheless, this is beyond the scope of this paper, 
4 In the categories II and III we considered a few other ratios as well: however, they were excluded from further 
analysis due to their high correlation (over 0.6) with other variables from the set.162
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though it leaves some room for further research. Moreover, these variables are unavaila-
ble in the banking statistics or they are difficult to measure, which is why taking into ac-
count the measures of e.g. management quality could give rise to doubts as regards its 
definitions. However, apart from balance-sheet based relations we used also ratios based 
on other data to include some other strategy dimensions. For instance, we assume that ex-
penses incurred in the development of a branch network or expenditure on advertisement 
should be reflected in the variables that we take into account. 
Adopted research method  5 
5.1 Grouping of banks 
There are many methods of grouping of companies. According to Halkidi et al. (2001), 
the following clustering procedures can be differentiated: 
partitional clustering - consists in partitioning the population into a predetermined  •	
number of clusters. The number of clusters is de  termined on the basis of a prede-
termined optimisation criterion (e.g. minimisation of the loss of information), 
hierarchical clustering - groups are obtained recursively as a result of agglomerat- •	
ing smaller clusters into larger ones, and the adequate indicator of the cut-off level 
(e.g. the inconsistency ratio) is used as a criterion of stopping the procedure before 
obtaining only one group, 
density-based clustering - clusters are formed in such a way that the appropri  ately  •	
measured density of the elements in clusters is increased, 
grid-based clustering - groups are created as a result of dividing the element fea- •	
ture space into cubes. By this very simple method, clusters are created from single 
cubes that elements of the population fall into. 
Of these four types of clustering methods only two - partitional and hierar  chical - were 
able to be considered in the work for this article. The grid-based clustering method re-
quires predefined partition of values of variables applied in the al  gorithm for grids, where-
as by the density-based clustering method the choice of the tolerance parameters is usu-
ally tricky and algorithms might be very sensitive to the initial values of the parameters. 
Moreover, density-based procedures perform well if clusters are supposed to be convex 
sets in data space. Finally, hierarchical methods handle noisy observations and outliers in 
a better way than partitional clustering. For the above mentioned reasons, we decided to 
use the hierarchical clustering method. Nevertheless, consistency of results was tested by 
using different measures of distance applied in this clustering algorithm. Last but not least, 
the results of the hierarchi  cal clustering analysis can be visualised in form of dendrograms, 
which is of undeniable importance when analysing consistency of results. 
Cluster analysis does not end up with the mere classification of items to groups. The 
adequacy of the results has to be justified by carrying out sig  nificance tests in terms of 
selected analysis criteria or the purpose of building of clusters. These can be done by ap-
plying some statistical or econometric tests. In the case of the models that lack a defined 
probabilistic structure (e.g. when clusters are fuzzy sets) adequate validity indices may be 
used alternatively. 163
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While grouping the banks, we used Ward’s algorithm. This allows the minimization 
of distances between variables within a group, i.e. maximization of the group’s homoge-
neity. The advantage of this hierarchical method is that it makes illustrating interdepend-
encies between groups possible. The so-called den  drograms that are created during the 
visualisation of the algorithm allow for the definition of distances between clusters and 
the isolation of elements that are most alike within a given group, as well as elements that 
fit less well into the cluster, in terms of the clustering criterion used. Ward (1963) pointed 
out that the purpose of his research was to find a breakdown of a population, which would 
minimise the loss of information about the population, resulting from the clustering proc-
ess. In his search for optimal clustering, Ward limited himself to proce  dures that, in each 
step, decrease the number of groups by 1 and minimise the loss of information. Ward’s 
(1963) approach was a compromise between the simplicity of the scheme and its optimal-
ity in the broadest meaning. 
Ward’s procedure comprises n subsequent steps, where n is a number of elements (in 
this paper, the elements are banks) of the starting set. Ward assumed that a structure where 
every two elements belong to two different groups contains the fullest information about 
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groups remaining from the previous step of the procedure arc merged in a way that will 
minimise the increase in the cost of information loss, i.e. - as Ward assumed - the  dG H i
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Wardova  procedura  obuhvaća  n  uzastopnih  koraka,  pri  čemu  je  n  broj  elemenata  (u  ovom  radu 
elementi su banke) početnog skupa. Ward je pretpostavio da struktura u kojoj svaka dva elementa 
pripadaju različitim grupama sadržava najpotpuniju informaciju o elementima istraživanog skupa. U 
nultom koraku stvaraju se grupe s jednim elementom od svih elemenata istraživane populacije. U 
svakom sljedećem koraku algoritma dvije grupe iz prethodnog koraka procedure spajaju se na način 
koji minimizira povećanje troška gubitka informacija, tj. kao što Ward pretpostavlja – vrijednosti 
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gdje  su  G x ,  H x ,  G n   i  H n   srednje  vrijednosti  elemenata  skupova  G  i  H  i  njihove  veličine, 
minimizirane  nakon  svih  podjela  GH  u  skupove  G  i  H  dobivenih  u  koraku  i  –  1 
( GH H G     i  0    H G ). Drugim riječima, dvije su grupe spojene u određenom koraku 
ako se ne može pronaći nijedan drugi par grupa s manjom međusobno udaljenosti. Nakon spajanja 
dviju grupa procedura se nastavlja sa sljedećim korakom. Pritom je 
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i d  mjera udaljenosti – grupe su 
identificirane s njihovim „srednjim“ elementom (prosječni reprezentativni element), te se izračunava 
Euklidova udaljenost među njima. U svakom pojedinom koraku spajaju se samo dvije grupe, dok sve 
ostale ostaju nepromijenjene. 
Robusnost  rezultata  određivanja  klastera  testirana  je  uz  pomoć  Wardova  algoritma  s  različitim 
mjerama udaljenosti: „aritmetičkom sredinom“ i „prosječnom vrijednosti“ (Gordon, 1999). Za svaku 
godinu navodimo postotak banaka koje su klasificirane u istu grupu primjenom triju različitih mjera 
udaljenosti.  
Kao rezultat primjene opisane procedure svi su elementi populacije svrstani u klastere, tj. procedura ne 
ostavlja nijedan element neklasificiranim. Sam algoritam nema mehanizam koji bi mu omogućio da se 
zaustavi  prije  stvaranja  jedne  grupe  svih  elemenata  (banaka),  nakon  što  se  formira  m  grupa 
( n m   1 ).  Međutim,  kada  se  analizira  hijerarhija  grupa  formiranih  u  uzastopnim  koracima, 
možemo se koristiti nekim dodatnim kriterijem za zaustavljanje algoritma. Takav bi kriterij mogao, na 
primjer,  pretpostaviti  koliki  dio  varijance  treba  biti  objašnjen.  Ipak,  budući  da  veći  broj  grupa 
(klastera) objašnjava više varijance, broj klastera također ne bi trebao biti prevelik jer bi to otežalo 
identifikaciju grupa koje su stabilne s protokom vremena. Nasuprot tome, premali broj klastera može 
dovesti do stvaranja klastera sastavljenih od banaka različitih djelatnosti i profila rizičnosti koji na 
različite načine utječu na profitabilnost.  
Problem odabira kritične razine može se izbjeći primjenom odgovarajuće verzije metode utemeljene 
na indeksu kohezije grupa, npr. na indeksu Celinski-Harabasz, Dunn indeksu itd. (Halkidi i dr., 2001). 
Indeks se izračunava za unaprijed određen broj klastera za koje se pretpostavlja da su rezultat primjene 
 and GH ∩= 0
Wardova  procedura  obuhvaća  n  uzastopnih  koraka,  pri  čemu  je  n  broj  elemenata  (u  ovom  radu 
elementi su banke) početnog skupa. Ward je pretpostavio da struktura u kojoj svaka dva elementa 
pripadaju različitim grupama sadržava najpotpuniju informaciju o elementima istraživanog skupa. U 
nultom koraku stvaraju se grupe s jednim elementom od svih elemenata istraživane populacije. U 
svakom sljedećem koraku algoritma dvije grupe iz prethodnog koraka procedure spajaju se na način 
koji minimizira povećanje troška gubitka informacija, tj. kao što Ward pretpostavlja – vrijednosti 
) , (
2 H G d i , pri čemu je:  
H G
H G
H G i n n
x x
n n H G d


 
2
2 ) , (       ( 1 )  
gdje  su  G x ,  H x ,  G n   i  H n   srednje  vrijednosti  elemenata  skupova  G  i  H  i  njihove  veličine, 
minimizirane  nakon  svih  podjela  GH  u  skupove  G  i  H  dobivenih  u  koraku  i  –  1 
( GH H G     i  0    H G ). Drugim riječima, dvije su grupe spojene u određenom koraku 
ako se ne može pronaći nijedan drugi par grupa s manjom međusobno udaljenosti. Nakon spajanja 
dviju grupa procedura se nastavlja sa sljedećim korakom. Pritom je 
2
i d  mjera udaljenosti – grupe su 
identificirane s njihovim „srednjim“ elementom (prosječni reprezentativni element), te se izračunava 
Euklidova udaljenost među njima. U svakom pojedinom koraku spajaju se samo dvije grupe, dok sve 
ostale ostaju nepromijenjene. 
Robusnost  rezultata  određivanja  klastera  testirana  je  uz  pomoć  Wardova  algoritma  s  različitim 
mjerama udaljenosti: „aritmetičkom sredinom“ i „prosječnom vrijednosti“ (Gordon, 1999). Za svaku 
godinu navodimo postotak banaka koje su klasificirane u istu grupu primjenom triju različitih mjera 
udaljenosti.  
Kao rezultat primjene opisane procedure svi su elementi populacije svrstani u klastere, tj. procedura ne 
ostavlja nijedan element neklasificiranim. Sam algoritam nema mehanizam koji bi mu omogućio da se 
zaustavi  prije  stvaranja  jedne  grupe  svih  elemenata  (banaka),  nakon  što  se  formira  m  grupa 
( n m   1 ).  Međutim,  kada  se  analizira  hijerarhija  grupa  formiranih  u  uzastopnim  koracima, 
možemo se koristiti nekim dodatnim kriterijem za zaustavljanje algoritma. Takav bi kriterij mogao, na 
primjer,  pretpostaviti  koliki  dio  varijance  treba  biti  objašnjen.  Ipak,  budući  da  veći  broj  grupa 
(klastera) objašnjava više varijance, broj klastera također ne bi trebao biti prevelik jer bi to otežalo 
identifikaciju grupa koje su stabilne s protokom vremena. Nasuprot tome, premali broj klastera može 
dovesti do stvaranja klastera sastavljenih od banaka različitih djelatnosti i profila rizičnosti koji na 
različite načine utječu na profitabilnost.  
Problem odabira kritične razine može se izbjeći primjenom odgovarajuće verzije metode utemeljene 
na indeksu kohezije grupa, npr. na indeksu Celinski-Harabasz, Dunn indeksu itd. (Halkidi i dr., 2001). 
Indeks se izračunava za unaprijed određen broj klastera za koje se pretpostavlja da su rezultat primjene 
). In other words, two groups are merged in a given step, 
if no other pair of groups with a smaller distance between them can be found. When two 
groups are merged, the procedure goes to the next step. Next, di
2 is a measure of distance 
- the groups are identified with their “mean” element (the average representative) and the 
Euclidean distance between them is calculated. In a given step only two groups are merged, 
whereas all the others remain unchanged. 
Robustness of clustering results was tested by means of Ward algorithm with differ-
ent distance measures: “mean” and “average” (Gordon, 1999). For each year, we report-
ed the percentage of banks which were classified to the same group applying three differ-
ent measures of distance. 
As a result of applying the procedure mentioned above, all the elements of a popula-
tion are clustered, i.e. the procedure does not leave any elements unclassified. The algo-
rithm itself does not have any mechanism that would allow it to be stopped before the cre-
ation of one group of all the elements (banks), when m groups (1<< mn ), are created. 
However, when analysing the hierarchy of the groups created in subsequent steps, we can 
use some additional criteria to stop the algorithm. Such a criterion could, for instance, as-164
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sume what part of the variance should be explained. Nevertheless, since the larger the 
number of groups (clusters), the more variance is explained, the number of clusters should 
not be excessively large, either, as it would make identification of groups that remain sta-
ble over time more difficult. On the contrary, too small a number of clusters may lead to 
creating clusters comprised of banks of different activity or risk profiles, which will af-
fect profitability in different ways. 
However, the problem of selecting the cut-off level may be avoided through the use 
of an adequate variant of the method based on a group cohesion index, e.g. Celinski-Hara-
basz index, Dunn index, etc. (Halkidi et al., 2001). For a predetermined number of clus-
ters, which are supposed to result from the use of a selected method of clustering, an index 
is calculated. Then the breakdown that gives the highest value of the index is the optimal 
one. Nevertheless, the choice of an index itself usually is an issue of controversy. 
In the initial phase of our research, a cut-off rule was adopted, which was used to iso-
late more than one group. It is based on the so-called inconsis  tency ratios, which measure 
the weight of linkages created between elements comprising particular groups - the” clos-
er” to each other the two elements are in terms of their isolated features (the more they 
are alike), the lower the inconsistency ratios. A number of groups proved to be sensitive 
to the level of criterion adopted. Slight changes in the cut-off level caused a two-fold in-
crease in the number of groups. 
However, a different criterion turned out to be better for stopping the procedure. We 
defined the distance level above which building of subse  quent groups was stopped. The 
stopping level was defined as a percentage of the maximum distance between groups, 
which merging in the next step would result in the whole studied population becoming 
one single group. In other words, it represents the percentage of the distance between 
groups in the case where there is no stopping criterion and, as a result of using the algo-
rithm, there are only 2 groups left. The percentage of the distance was determined at 70%. 
Therefore, the stopping level defines the depth down to which the merging of the popu-
lation elements into groups takes place. 
Alternatively, the balance between the number of clusters and explained variance may 
be defined with the use of “jack-knifing”, i.e. through defining a boundary (acceptable) 
percentage of unclassified banks, e.g. at 10%, or with the use of discriminative analysis, 
i.e. finding a boundary (op  timal) percentage of explained variance on the basis of the 
adopted optimisation criterion (target function). 
5.2 Strategic groups and banks’ performance 
When comparing the classification of items into clusters in different years, a question 
arises about the stability of the allocation in time. Thus, be  fore delving into banks’ per-
formance within and between groups we had to find out whether clusters obtained using 
Ward’s algorithm form sustainable strategic groups. Clusters have been calculated on the 
basis of annual data from 1997 and 2005. To assess the stability of the groups we used the 
per  centage of banks migrating between the clusters identified in different years. 
The main aim of this paper is to verify whether allocating banks into strategic groups 
improves modelling of the financial result of the banking sector as a whole. This may be 
the case only if the performance differs significantly between the groups. Thus, we test 
the following hypothesis: 165
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  •	 H0: The identified groups differ significantly in terms of their performance. 
Since the breakdown of banks into groups should help in defining different profita-
bility levels, the return on assets - as one of the profitability mea  sures - was used to test 
the diversity of groups.5 Should two groups of identical distributions emerge, there would 
be no use in differentiating between them. Thus, Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics was used 
(Gajek and Kaluszka, 2000) to test whether the distributions of the following ratios: net 
income from banking activity / total assets and the pre-tax earnings / total assets differ 
significantly between groups. This test is very sensitive to the shape of distribution around 
the mean due to the way of defining the distance of distributions as the maximum distance 
between the points of the cumu  lative distribution function. It also generates relatively high 
Type II errors, although it has a relatively high power for smaller samples (Capon, 1965; 
Smirnov, 1948). The null hypothesis for each pair of groups is the equality of profitabil-
ity distributions in the groups. The hypothesis was tested on three significance levels - 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. 
To test the main hypothesis we run also panel regression models of three variables - 
pre-tax earnings over total assets (ROA), non-interest income over total assets (NII) and 
irregular loans over total loans (IRL). Let us de  note them as variables of type DEP, i.e. 
dependent variables. Should ROA and NII be explained by different explanatory varia-
bles, it would support hypothesis H0 about performance differences among the identified 
groups. Moreover, if the parameters of the same explanatory variable differ signifi  cantly 
among the models for different groups, it would indicate that banks’ reaction to external 
shocks - the value of the parameter - depends, among other things, on the banks’ alloca-
tion to the groups. In this regard, the significant group variable would also support the 
view that banks behave differently between the groups and similarly within the group, 
since there exist a similar though unidentified commonality in banks’ behaviour within 
the group. This would be in line with the strategic group theory, which claims that reac-
tions to shocks are an important factor of groups’ differentiation. 
The IRL variable is not related to banks’ earnings but reflects the quality of assets of 
banks and may, nevertheless, be important in banking sector stability analysis. Hence, we 
tested the following hypothesis H0’: 
  •	 H0’: The identified groups differ significantly in terms of their loan portfolio qual-
ity.6 
Possible differentiation between the groups in terms of loan portfolio quality would 
suggest that banks’ strategies may be related to the adopted risk profiles. Although in the 
strategic group literature this topic has so far hardly been given attention, we think this is 
an interesting issue which deserves testing. However, to put this hypothesis into context, 
it is worth noting, that although loan portfolio quality may be a result of many different 
parameters, such as credit market segment, type of customers, sector composition of the 
portfolio, quality of the lending practices, etc., or the market strategy of a company, it does 
5 In order to explain differences in profitability, other authors use also return on equity ratio. 
6 The literature casts doubts on the application of IRL as a measure of loan quality suggesting that rather a ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans should be used instead. Nevertheless, we use a more common measure of the 
quality of loans since the differences between the two ratios are not big in the period we analyse.166
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Source: authors’ specification
not necessarily determine the profitability of a bank, since this also stems from the pric-
ing policy, or pricing strategy, of a bank. The interaction of these two strategies results in 
the positioning of a bank in the space of performance distribution. Thus, even if the stra-
tegic groups differ in terms of profitability, it does not imply that they differ in terms of 
credit quality. The opposite statement is true, too. 
Table 1: Variables used in panel regression
Variable  Type  Lags Description
AEq BANK assets over tier1 capital
C2Income BANK 1y cost-income ratio
CLoans2T BANK 1y corporate loans over total loans
DepCorp2A BANK corporate deposits over total assets
DepMinLoans2A BANK deposits less loans over total assets
Foreign BANK 0-1 variable: 1 indicates that a bank at a given
point of time is foreign owned
FXLoans2A BANK foreign currency loans over total assets
Group(k) GROUP 0-1 variable: 1 indicates that a given bank 
belongs to group number k
HipoL2HL BANK 1y mortgage loans to households over total loans 
to households
HipoL2T BANK mortgage loans to households over total loans
IrrLoans2T BANK, DEP (IRL) irregular loans to total loans
IrrMedian BANK dierence between IrrLoans2T and a median
value of IrrLoans2T for all banks at the end of
given quarter (IFRS led to signif. changes in 
ratios of irregular loans after Dec 31, 2005)
LoansA BANK 1y loans over total assets
LogA BANK log (assets)
NII2A BANK, DEP (NII) non-interest income over total assets
NII2AMedian BANK, DEP (NIIm) dierence between NII2A and a median
value of NII2A for all banks for a given 
quarter (to compensate for changes in 
denition of non-interest income due to IFRS)
ROA BANK, DEP 1y return on assets (pretax earnings to total 
assets)
RecDepI BANK interbank loans received less placed in other
banks over total assets
TBillsA BANK t-bills of Polish government over total assets
GDP MACRO 1-8q GDP y/y
HHI MACRO Herndahl-Hirschman Index of concentration 
of banks’ assets
IFRS MACRO 0-1: 1 for quarters after Dec 31, 2005, when 
banks were allowed to adopt IFRS 
(eg. classication of NII has changed)
PPI MACRO 1y purchasing power parity
Wibor3Mq MACRO 3 month WIBOR rate
WIG20q MACRO quarterly change of WIG20 stock exchange 
index on Warsaw Stock Exchange167
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Variables of type DEP were regressed on variables of type GROUP and on the con-
trolling variables of two types, which may influence banks’ finan  cial results or be relevant 
for the risks to which a bank is exposed. Each variable Group(k), k E {1, ... ,5}, from type 
GROUP indicates that a given bank belongs to group number k, i.e. has value 1 if the bank 
belongs to group k and 0 otherwise. The first type of controlling variables - the bank spe-
cific type (BANK) - encompasses banks’ balance sheet and profit and loss ac  count indi-
cators, the second one - the macroeconomic type (MACRO)   covers variables describing 
the macroeconomic environment, in which banks operate and indicating some changes in 
the financial accounting standards. In table 1 we presents detailed definitions of the vari-
ables. We control for many factors commonly used in the vast literature on the subject 
(see e.g. DeYoung and Rice (2004); Goddard et al. (2004); Stiroh (2002)), however, not 
for all variables used in the cluster analysis. This was impossible, as some of the series 
used for grouping were highly correlated and caused colinearity problems. 
We eatimated the following equations: 
varv ar var
()
it
DEP
i
k
it
BANK
t
MACRO Group =+ ++ αβ 01 β β2 + uit (2)
where varit
DEP is one of the 4 dependent variables, varit
BANK stands for the bank specific var-
iables, vart
MACRO are macroeconomic variables, which vary only in time and uit it i :=+ ε uit it i :=+ ε  
is an error component with random individual effects  i. 
Taking into account the goal of the paper, a key variable among the regres  sors is that 
describing adherence of banks to strategic group (Group(k)). Each panel regression was 
performed on the whole sample of variables; how  ever we used only one of the group var-
iables in each model, i.e. we tested, whether an allocation of a bank to a given group pro-
vides additional infor  mation which improves the explanation of the independent variable. 
If the parameter at variable Group(k) is statistically significant in a given equation for a 
given dependent variable varDEP it means that, controlling for bank specific variables,   
varDEP differs on average in group k from other banks in financial system. Thus, H0 can-
not be rejected. The significance of the parameter would also suggest that the group var-
iable is important in modelling varDEP in the Polish banking sector, which implies that stra-
tegic groups may improve the prediction of the banking sector results or risk taken. This 
is an impor  tant implication for financial stability analysis of the banking sector, since ig-
noring strategic group variables in a model of banks’ profitability or loan portfolio qual-
ity could blur the assessment of banks’ growth potential, asset quality or banks’ credit risk, 
which all are crucial elements of the financial stability analysis. 
Having identified the stable composition of groups after 2000, we assumed that group 
composition in 2005 applies to the entire 2000-2005 period. This is a strong assumption, 
however, it is sufficient for comparison purposes. 
Since groups do not change in time, random effect estimation (General Least Square 
(GLS) procedure, Swamy-Arora method (SWAR)) had to be used. This allows both the 
cross-bank and the time-series variation included in the observations to be controlled while 
un  observed individual effects are simultaneously embedded. In the second theoretically 
possible type of model - a fixed effects one - only parameters of variables that change in 168
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time can be estimated. As Baltagi (2001) suggests, SWAR gives asymptotically efficient 
general least square estimators, which are better - in this respect - then OLS and within es-
timators. Since there is no evidence which of the known GLS methods (eg. SWAR., Am-
emiya or Nerlove) provide more accurate estimates, we applied the most popular one. 
Consistency of the random effect estimators was verified by means of the Hausman 
test. Hypothesis of no individual effects in the model (2) cov( ,) uu it is = 0 cov( ,) uu it is = 0 for st ≠ )   
was verified by the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Mul  tiplier test and ANOVA F test based on 
comparison of within and pooling estimation. In case of inconsistent estimators in the 
random effect model we used a Hausman-Taylor (HT) model as a remedy (Baltagi et al., 
2003). We tested consistency of HT estimators (in other words strict exogeneity of in-
struments) by means of the Hausman test comparing within and HT estimators (HT vs 
FE test). The following instrumental variables were used in the regressions: C2Income, 
AEq, LogA, IrrMediana, HipoL2T, WIG20q in equa  tions explaining ROA; ROA1yLag, 
C2Income1yLag, AEq, LogA, HipoL2T, WIG20q in equations explaining IRL; and C2In-
come, AEq, LogA, IrrMedi  ana, HipoL2T, WIG20q in equations for NII. The reader can 
find more about the adopted procedures for testing hypothesis for panel regressions in 
Baltagi (2001). 
The estimations were run on the period from 1st quarter 2000 to 4th quarter 2005. The 
maximum lag we used was 2 years (on GDP). 
Results  6 
6.1 Identified groups 
Should the strategic groups exist, the allocation of banks to clusters should not differ 
much in time. Figure 1 presents an analysis of the sta  bility of the clusters identified in 
one-dimensional analysis over time, i.e. an attempt to identify strategic groups in the Polish 
banking sector. 
All banks, which until 2005 were independent organisations, are sorted on the basis 
of their assignment to the cluster in 2005. The one-dimensional clustering allowed iden-
tification of the following groups of banks, the names of which were determined on the 
basis of the dominant profile of bank business in particular clusters: universal banks, cor-
porate banks, car finance banks, mortgage banks, retail banks and regional banks that 
associate cooperative banks. However, it is important to notice that naming of the identi-
fied groups is not necessary for further analysis, in particular, to run the panel regressions 
or to support our hypothesis. We could use the numbering of the groups instead. Never-
theless, to make our results more intuitive and related to the different banks’ business pro-
files, which we think the identified groups adequately represent, we named the groups. 
To support our view on the accuracy of the allocation of banks to the groups in re-
spect to their business profiles, consider the group of universal banks, which consist of 
all largest Polish commercial banks, which operate both on the consumer as well as on 
the corporate credit market. The car finance group consists of five banks that specialise 
only in car financing and have well known car brand names in the firm name (Daimler-
Chrysler, GM, FORD, Volkswagen, Toyota). Moreover, the retail banks group is com-169
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Bank group number: 1 – retail; 2 – mortgage; 3 – corporate; 4 – car industry; 5 – universal;   
6 – regional.
Note: In this case, symbol * denotes banks that are not classied.
Source: own calculations.
posed of relatively new banks, whose strategy is based on relying on their own strong de-
pository base, such as Bank Porztowy (Post bank), which has offices in most of the post 
offices across Poland or Lukas bank and Dominet bank, which started to build their own 
depository base in big consumer trade centres or stores. 
Table 2: Clusters of banks - cumulative table
No. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Bank name
1 1 5 1 1 1 * 1 LUKAS B. Swietok. SA
2 1 1 Polski Kred. B./HSBC Polska
3 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 B. Pocztowy SA
4 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 GE Cap. B. SA
5 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 AIG B. (Pol) SA
6 6 2 2 4 2 1 CC B. SA
7 1 5 1 B. SPOLEM SA
8 5 5 5 1 1 5 1 Dominet B. SA
9 6 6 6 2 5 2 2 Gosp. B. Wielk. SA
10 2 2 2 2 HYPO-B. (Pol) SA
11 6 6 6 2 2 B. Pol. Spoldz. SA
12 6 6 6 2 5 2 2 Maz. B. Reg. SA
13 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 Rheihyp-BRE Hip. SA
14 2 3 3 2 Danske B. (Pol) SA
15 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 Westd. Landesb. (Pol) SA
16 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 Rabob. (Pol) SA
17 2 2 2 2 5 5 2 BGK SA
18 2 3 3 5 3 3 3 ABN AMRO B. (Pol) SA
19 3 3 3 3 DZ B. (Pol) SA
20 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Raffeisen-Centrob. SA
21 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Cred. Lyonnais B. (Pol) SA
22 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 BNP-Dresdner B. (Pol) SA
23 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Deutsche B. (Pol) SA
24 3 3 3 MHB B. (Pol) SA
25 3 3 3 3 B. of Tokyo-Mitsub. (Pol) SA
26 * 2 6 1 2 2 4 DaimlerChrysler Serv. B. SA
27 1 1 6 1 4 2 4 GMAC B. SA
28 1 1 6 1 4 2 4 FORD B. (Pol) SA
29 1 1 6 1 4 2 4 Volksw. B. (Pol) SA
30 2 6 1 4 2 4 Toyota B. (Pol) SA
31 5 3 3 3 3 3 5 BH SA (in Citigroup)
32 5 3 3 3 3 5 BW Euro SA
33 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 PKO BP SA
34 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 ING BSK SA
35 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 B. Przem.-Handl. SA
36 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 WBK SA
37 5 3 3 3 5 5 5 BRE Bank SA
38 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 B. Millenium SA
39 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 B. Pekao SA
40 5 5 5 BISE SA
41 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Nordea B. Polska SA
42 5 5 5 5 5 5 Kredyt B. SA
43 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 BOS SA
44 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 GBG SA
45 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 Fortis B. SA
46 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 Invest B. SA
47 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 DB 24 SA
48 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 BGZ SA170
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Table 3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distributions of ROA measures in the groups of banks
Cutting level 0.6
Comparison of distributions of pre-tax earnings
Percentage of rejected null hypotheses Year
Clusters by 
variables
Significance  
level
 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 Total
All categories  0.01
jointly  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3
  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.6  0.8
  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.8
0.8
2.6
3.3
All categories   Suma 
jointly 
  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.6  1.5  2.0 6.7
Category I  0.01
(assets)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0
  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.0
  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.7  0.5  0.0
0.5
1.5
2.2
Category I   Suma 
(assets) 
  0.7  0.8  0.0  0.3  0.0  1.0  1.3  0.0 4.2
Category II   0.01 
(liabilities)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
  0.4  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.6  0.0  0.3  0.2
  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.3
0.3
2.1
3.5
Category II   Suma 
(liabilities)   
  0.9  0.5  1.0  0.9  1.4  0.0  0.7  0.5 5.9
Category III.   0.01  
(financial result)  0.05
  0.10
  1.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.0  0.7  0.0
  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.7  0.7  1.0
1.3
3.7
5.3
Category III   Suma 
(financial result) 
  3.0  1.7  0.0  0.7  2.0  0.7  1.3  1.0 10.3
  Total   5.1  3.6  1.3  2.4  4.1  2.3  4.8  3.5 27.1
Cutting level 0.7
Comparison of distributions of pre-tax earnings
Percentage of rejected null hypotheses Year
Clusters by 
variables
Significance  
level
 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 Total
All categories   0.01
jointly  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3
  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.7  0.8
  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.8
0.5
2.3
3.5
All categories   Suma 
jointly 
  0.3  0.6  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.7  1.5  2.0 6.3
Category I   0.01
(assets)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0
  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.7  0.0
  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0  1.0  0.7  0.0
0.7
2.3
2.7
Category I   Suma 
(assets) 
  0.7  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.0  2.0  2.0  0.0 5.7
Category II   0.01 
(liabilities)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.7  0.6  0.0  0.3  0.0
  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.7
0.6
1.9
2.9
Category II   Suma 
(liabilities)   
  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.7  1.4  0.0  0.7  0.7 5.4
Category III   0.01  
(financial result)  0.05
  0.10
  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.0  0.7  0.0
  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.0
1.0
3.0
3.7
Category III   Suma 
(financial result) 
  3.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  2.0  0.7  1.3  0.0 7.7
  Total   4.0  1.3  1.0  3.2  4.1  3.3  5.5  2.7 25.0171
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Note: Percentages of null hypothesis rejections reported.
Cutting level 0.6
Comparison of distributions of net income from banking activity
Percentage of rejected null hypotheses Year
Clusters by 
variables
Significance  
level
 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 Total
All categories  0.01
jointly  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.0
  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3
  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.3  0.5
1.2
2.5
3.3
All categories   Suma 
jointly 
  0.5  0.4  0.7  1.5  1.2  1.1  0.8  0.8 7.0
Category I.  0.01
(assets)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.7  0.5  0.3
  0.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.5
  0.6  0.5  0.0  0.3  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.5
2.0
3.3
3.9
Category I   Suma 
(assets) 
  0.9  1.2  0.0  0.3  1.7  2.0  1.8  1.3 9.2
Category II   0.01 
(liabilities)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2
  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.3
  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.7
0.8
2.6
3.7
Category II   Suma 
(liabilities)   
  0.9  1.2  1.8  0.6  1.1  0.3  0.0  1.2 7.1
Category III  0.01  
(financial result)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0
  0.0  0.3  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.0
0.7
2.0
2.7
Category III   Suma 
(financial result) 
  0.0  0.3  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.7  0.3  0.0 5.3
  Total   2.3  3.1  4.5  4.4  4.0  4.1  3.0  3.3 28.7
Cutting level 0.7
Comparison of distributions of net income from banking activity
Percentage of rejected null hypotheses Year
Clusters by 
variables
Significance  
level
 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 Total
Sve kategorije  0.01
zajedno  0.05
  0.10
  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.0
  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.3  0.3
  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.3  0.5
1.5
3.2
3.8
Sve kategorije   Suma 
zajedno 
  1.5  1.2  1.3  0.2  1.2  1.5  0.8  0.8 8.5
Category I   0.01
(assets)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.7  0.3
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  0.7  0.7
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.0  1.0  0.7  0.7
3.0
3.3
3.7
Category I   Suma 
(assets) 
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  3.0  3.0  2.0  1.7 10.0
Category II   0.01 
(liabilities)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0
  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.7
  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.7
0.6
1.9
2.4
Category II   Suma 
(liabilities)   
  0.0  0.3  1.8  0.0  1.1  0.3  0.0  1.3 4.9
Category III   0.01  
(financial result)  0.05
  0.10
  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0
  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.0
0.7
2.0
2.3
Category III   Suma 
(financial result) 
  0.0  0.0  2.0  2.0  0.0  0.7  0.3  0.0 5.0
  Total   1.5  1.5  5.2  2.5  5.3  5.5  3.2  3.8 28.5172
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Furthermore, the existence of all groups and the reliability of the alloca  tion of banks 
to the groups in 2005 cluster could be supported by an expert assessment. Membership of 
banks in groups identified in 2005 overlaps to a large extent with the classification by the 
General Inspectorate of Banking Supervision (GINB), which is based on the inspection 
knowledge of the major business lines of Polish banks. Apart from this, there exists no 
other classifi  cation of Polish banks, so we could not further cross check the results of the 
allocation. Nevertheless, since the allocation overlaps to a large extent with the GINB clas-
sification and is in line with the banks’ main business profiles, we adopt the naming of the 
groups and the allocation of banks identified in the 2005 cluster for further analysis. 
The most stable over time are groups of corporate and universal banks. Less stable 
are groups of retail and mortgage banks. The least stable group is the car finance group, 
but it stems from a relatively small number of banks in this group. In the years 1997-2001 
there was also a stable group of regional banks. Some banks tended to migrate between 
the groups, particularly prior to 2000, but there are also banks, which did not change their 
group membership over the whole period. 
Robustness check, i.e. classification by means of different measures of dis  tance, 
showed significant improvement in consistency of the clustering results over time. In 
2000, only 56.6% of banks were classified to the same group irrespectively of the distance 
measure. In 2003, the ratio rose to 65% and further increased to 77.6% in 2005. Certain-
ly, the differences in the composition of groups resulting either from different sets of de-
scriptive variables and the clustering methods can impact the verification of the hypoth-
eses. However, we chose the clustering algorithm which has a very intuitive inter  pretation 
in terms of the loss of information (see subsection 5.1). We also focused on the broad, ex-
pert-based range of variables exhibiting an econom  ically meaningful relationship with the 
strategies of banks. 
The analysis of dendrograms and the analysis of sustainability of clusters over time, 
measured as a percentage of banks migrating between clusters, al  lowed us to make a state-
ment that groups stable over time can only be singled out starting from the year 2000. This 
may be related to significant changes of the ownership of banks in the years 1998-1999 
followed by the extensive privatisation program. The further consequent stabilisation of 
groups may be an indication of converging strategies, whereby groups of banks follow 
similar strategies adopted from their major investors. 
The percentages of rejected null hypotheses of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the 
lack of a significant difference between the distributions of the pre-tax earnings / total as-
sets or net income from banking activity / total assets ratios among the banks assigned to 
particular clusters are reported in Table 3 for three significance levels. The percentages 
are presented for clusters identified for particular categories (the multidimensional anal-
ysis) and for all the categories jointly (the one-dimensional analysis). For example “0.5” 
on Table 3 on the crossing of row “Category I (assets) 0.05” and column “2003” means 
that 50% of null hypothesis about equal distributions of ROA of Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests at the 5% significance level was rejected for all pairs of groups of banks found using 
Category I variables in year 2003. The higher the percentage of rejections the stronger the 
support of the thesis that groups differ in the distribution of profitability measured by 173
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ROA. The aim of this exercise is to help in identifying the categories and years, in which 
significant differences in distributions of pre-tax earnings or net income from banking ac-
tivity emerge. 
It stems from Table 3 that significantly higher percentages of rejected null hypothe-
ses of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are only for variables of Category I (from the mul-
tidimensional analysis) and for all the variables jointly (one-dimensional analysis). These 
results are consistent with those of Hack  ethal (2001), who identified differences in prof-
itability between groups of European banks, but only using of market based variables (cf. 
Chapter 3). However, the percentages are higher only for the years 2000-2004, and in par-
ticular for the income from banking activity. No major differences have been observed in 
the distributions of profitability ratios: pre-tax earnings / total assets and net income from 
banking activity / total assets for other dimensions, i.e. for variables of Categories II and 
III. This means that the membership of a bank in a given group may be important for the 
explana  tion of differences in profitability after the year 2000, but only for groups identi-
fied of the basis of all variables jointly or on the basis of variables of Category I. In terms 
of the net income from banking activity, the percentage of rejected hypotheses is also 
higher between 1997 and 1999; however, the existence of strategic groups that would be 
meaningful for the explanation of differences in profitability in those years, cannot be 
confirmed when using pre-tax earnings / total assets instead. 
The results of the analysis seem to suggest that strategic groups in the Polish bank-
ing sector can be identified only after the year 2000. Therefore, we have obtained a pre-
liminary confirmation of the hypothesis that the strategy adopted by a bank leads to dif-
ferences in performance, but only for the second half of the analysed period. The next 
subsection elaborates on the issue of the usefulness of the classification of banks into 
groups in modeling basic variables that characterize bank performance. 
6.2 Hypothesis testing 
For further analysis we have adopted the clusters identified for 2005 as the composi-
tion of strategic groups in the Polish banking sector between 2000 and 2005 and used them 
to define the groups’ dummy variables. The Celinski  -Harabasz index, calculated for the 
2005 data, proves that the adopted cut-off level adequately characterised the number of 
clusters.7
Tables 4, 5 and 6 (see Appendix) present estimates of panel regression with random 
in  dividual effects of ROA, NIl and IRL, respectively. For each group three different mod-
els were reported. The first model includes all explanatory variables but the null hypoth-
eses of the Hausman test were rejected in all these models. This means that the random 
effects estimators are biased. For other models usually the null hypothesis of the Haus-
man test cannot be rejected, which means that random effects estimators are more effec-
tive than the fixed effects estimators. However, in this case, there is a risk of model mis-
specification, since too narrow a set of dependent variables may result in inconsistent es-
timates of parameters in the models. That is why we conducted HT method of estima  tion 
on a wide set of DEP variables. Table 7 (see Appendix) shows results of application of 
7 The highest value of the index that we have obtained corresponds to 5 clusters174
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Hausman-Taylor estimators to the models with the same set of explanatory variables as 
in the first model presented in Tables 1, 4, 5 and 6 for corre  sponding GROUP and DEP 
variables. Using the Hausman test we compared within and HT estimators and did not re-
ject null hypothesis of consistency of HT estimates for every model. 
Neither of the models for ROA with the retail group as explanatory GROUP variable 
passed the Hausman test. The Hausman-Taylor estimator confirmed the insignificance of 
retail and pointed to the insignificance of corporate group. How  ever, other groups proved 
to be important in explaining ROA in models with random individual effects. Controlling 
for leverage, cost effectiveness, risk taken and share of non interest income in total assets 
as well as including market concentration, business cycle and stock exchange perform-
ance into the regressions, we found dummy group variables to be statistically signifi  cant 
at the minimum 10% significance level. Thus, classifying banks into groups could im-
prove the explanation and prediction of ROA at the individual bank level as well as at the 
banking sector level. Moreover, the parameters of the same explanatory variables differ 
significantly among the models for different groups. 
The usefulness of the strategic groups in explaining the quality of loans as measured 
by irregular loans seems to be less promising when taking into account the very poor re-
sults of the Hausman test in case of models for IRL for most of the GROUP variables. In 
fact, the only group that was statistically significant was the group of corporate banks. 
However, we do not control for all effects in this model. HT estimators are significant 
only for retail and universal banks on 10% significance level. At the 5% level irregular 
loans in banks from the universal group are not statistically different than in other groups. 
Therefore, we conclude that the mortgage, corporate and car industry groups do not help 
in explaining the share of irregular loans. 
The lack of explanatory power of groups in the IRL models may result from the fact 
that the existence of strategic groups that differ in terms of profitability does not imply 
that the groups differ in terms of loan portfolio quality. Moreover, the data set we used in 
panel regression did not cover the full business cycle when the full variability of credit 
quality should emerge. However, it may also stern from the problems with the explana-
tory variable we used in our panel regressions. There were many changes in the loan classi-
fication criteria during the analysed period, which created structural breaks. Furthermore, 
banks in Poland did not write off lost loans from their balance sheets for tax reasons, which 
may lead to the problems with stationarity of the variables. In fact, recently Głogowski 
(2008) has found evidence of the usefulness of our classification of banks into groups in 
modelling loan port  folio quality using another variable, namely, net flow of loan loss pro-
visions, which is in Poland a more stable-over-time measure of loan quality.8 
On the other hand, group variables were significant in explaining NIl in the case of 
retail and mortgage bank groups. Application of HT estimator has even broadened the set 
of groups that are, significant in explaining differ  ences in non-interest income between 
banks. Only the group of car industry banks was not significant. Similarly as in the case 
8 Nevertheless, further research is needed to answer to the question about the rela  tionship between irregular or 
nonperforming loans and business profile reflected into the strategic group classification. Perhaps, a more reliable and 
comparable set of data on loan portfolio quality, e.g. collected in line with recently introduced IFRS reporting stand-
ards, is needed. 175
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of the models for ROE, pa  rameters for the same variables differ significantly among the 
groups. Thus, our classification of banks to the groups could be very helpful in modelling 
the non-interest income, too. 
Conclusions  7 
The cluster analysis proved to be useful in identifying the strategic groups in the Polish 
banking sector. However, stable groups had formed only after the year 2000, which may 
be associated with the major ownership changes in the Polish banking sector that took 
place between 1998 and 1999.
Following the analysis the panel regression analysis and using the Kolmogorov  -
Smirnov test we can make a statement that the classification of banks into strategic groups 
improves modelling of the banking sector profitability in terms of return on assets and net 
interest income. Thus, it should also im  prove the forecasting performance of the banking 
sector earnings. Moreover, the significance of group variables and the significant differ-
ences among the parameters of the same explanatory variables across the models for dif-
ferent groups suggest that the identified groups differ both in performance and in the way 
the banks allocated to particular groups react to the shocks to keep earnings on predefined 
levels. 
The breakdown of banks into groups did not help, however, in modelling the quality 
of loan portfolios as measured by the share of irregular loans in total loans but the issue 
should be investigated more deeply. 
Making use of the theory of strategic groups in identifying the structure of the bank-
ing sector facilitates a more accurate ex ante assessment of the banks’ potential and thus 
the stability of the financial system. 176
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